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Abstract: 
 
In 1911, Bergson visited Britain for a number of lectures which led to his increasing popularity. Russell 
personally encountered Bergson during his lecture at University College London on 28 October, and on 30 
October Bergson attended one of Russell’s lectures. Russell went on to write a number of critical articles on 
Bergson, contributing to the hundreds of publications on Bergson which ensued following these lectures. 
Russell’s critical writings have been seen as part of a history of controversies between so-called 
‘Continental’ and ‘Analytic’ philosophers in the twentieth century. Yet Russell’s engagement with 
Bergson’s thought comes as a response to a particular British form of Bergsonism and is involved with the 
wider phenomenon of the British import of Bergsonism (by figures connected in different ways to Russell, 
such as Hulme, Wildon Carr or Eliot). Though this may challenge the view of Russell and Bergson as 
enacting an early version of the ‘Analytic’-‘Continental’ divide, there are however some particular 
characterisations of Bergson by Russell which contribute to the subsequent formation of the ‘rotten scene’ 
(Glendinning 2006: 69) of the divide in the second half of the twentieth century. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The twentieth century has seen the rise of an image of Western academic philosophy as 
divided between two predominant camps, one ‘Continental’ and the other ‘Analytic’. 
Whether some or other form of the division which this image purports to depict exists in 
reality is of course highly disputable and problematic. For example, though the origins of the 
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divide have been traced by some back to Kant or Hegel,
1
 it is clear that there are not two 
mutually exclusive philosophical movements (united by either theses, or topical, doctrinal, 
methodological, stylistic concerns) which have consistently divided themselves up according 
to some disagreement over nineteenth-century philosophy.
2
 Generalising attempts to map a 
number of dichotomies onto the ‘Analytic’-‘Continental’ divide (e.g. one side is Kantian, or 
scientistic, or counter-enlightenment, while the other is not) often fail to grasp the concrete 
historical nature of the phenomenon of the rise of such an image of a divide. 
The earliest diagnosable sign of confrontation between philosophers associated with either 
side is to be found in Frege’s (1894) polemical review of Husserl’s Philosophie der 
Arithmetik (1891). Yet even this dispute is clearly one between kindred spirits, and is only 
retrospectively related to some notion of divide between ‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental’ 
philosophy.
3
 Carnap’s 1931 criticism of Heidegger’s metaphysical language marks the first 
instance of philosophers associated with either side coming to a kind of aporia over a 
particular topic, though even this has been shown to be endemic within a Germanophone 
context where it would be inappropriate to talk of an ‘Analytic’-‘Continental’ divide.4 
Between 1894 and 1931, there is to be found an intriguing instance of an encounter 
between two leading philosophers of the early twentieth century: Bertrand Russell and Henri 
Bergson. Having met Bergson in 1911, Russell criticised his philosophy; Bergson did not 
respond to Russell’s criticisms. What is intriguing about Russell’s critique of Bergson is 
precisely the question of its status as a contribution to widening the ‘gulf’ between ‘Analytic’ 
                                                          
1
 See e.g. Braver 2007; Critchley 1997. 
2
 See e.g. Glendinning 2006; Glock 2008s. 
3
 See Dummett 1993: 26. 
4
 See e.g. Friedman 2000; Gabriel 2003; Rosado-Haddock 2008: 3. 
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and ‘Continental’ philosophy.5 In what follows, I examine Russell’s encounter with Bergson, 
and his subsequent critical commentary on Bergson’s philosophy written in 1912, focusing in 
particular on his review of Bergson’s Laughter (1911), and his presentation to ‘The Heretics 
Society’ of The Philosophy of Bergson. Through examining Russell’s encounter with 
Bergson, I aim to dispel the view that this was a product of a split between ’Analytic’ and 
’Continental’ philosophy which was already in place in 1911. Instead, I aim to show how 
both Bergson and Russell emerged from a climate which favoured international philosophical 
debate, of which the import of Bergsonism into Britain was a product. Russell’s critique of 
Bergson is shown to be a response to this import. Though the Russell-Bergson exchange was 
not the product of a split, but rather of an attempt towards exchange between philosophers in 
Britain and on the Continent, I claim that there are nevertheless several aspects of Russell’s 
characterisation of Bergson which have ended up contributing to the formation of the 
abovementioned image of a split. 
 
2. Philosophical Cosmopolitanism? 
 
2.1 Russell’s British context 
 
Russell and Bergson were both philosophers of supranational standing and renown. Not only 
did their influence extend beyond the confines of, respectively, the Anglophone or 
Francophone academic world, but also influences on their work came from a number of 
heterogeneous sources that lay outside such strictly confined spaces. 
                                                          
5
 Chase and Reynolds argue that Russell and Bergson were ‘significant in the development of the divide’ (2010: 
23) between analytic and continental philosophy. 
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The latter is particularly clear in the case of the third Earl Russell. Russell in a sense could 
not have avoided being ‘multi-cultural’ in his philosophical influences, given the 
environment in which he was educated. Late Victorian philosophical culture in Britain, and 
most prominently in England, was to a great extent dominated by so-called ‘British Idealism’, 
a loose grouping of philosophers who were thought to owe more to Hegel than to Locke and 
Hume. 
As early as 1840, J. S. Mill had already constructed a dichotomy between two tendencies 
in philosophy, the Benthamite Anglo-Saxon empiricist tradition which revolved around ideas 
of scientific progress, and the Coleridgean ‘Continental’ philosophy which was more or less 
romantic, reactionary and poetic.
6
 Mill proposed this dichotomy only in order to surpass it by 
showing the two sides to have mistaken part of the truth for the whole, and in the person of 
Mill the two tendencies which he describes were synthesised. 
The Coleridgean import of the ‘Continental’ idealists had a profound impact on British 
academic philosophy. If in 1840 there had been a struggle, as Mill described, between the 
Benthamites and the Coleridgeans, one might claim that it was the latter who had prevailed 
through the overwhelming dominance of Idealism in academic philosophy during the late 
nineteenth century. And even for those who attempted to counter the prominence of idealism, 
crucial exchange with Germanophone academia nevertheless took place. Perhaps the most 
striking example of such exchange was the influence of Brentano and his school on thinkers 
such as J. Ward and G. Stout, who were later themselves particularly influential on the rise of 
the rebellious new ‘analytic’ (or, ‘scientific’, which was the term preferred by its early 
proponents) philosophy developed by Moore and Russell.
7
 
                                                          
6
 Mill 1985. 
7
 See Bell 1999. 
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In his philosophical development, Russell would have to absorb and come to terms with a 
number of the aforementioned Germanophone influences. Together with Moore, they 
famously attacked the Hegelian doctrines of their predecessors. It is often assumed that their 
attacks were conclusive – a view which had been instrumental in establishing a kind of 
borderline between the old Continentalist philosophy of the Victorians and its modernising 
‘Analytic’ counterpart. This ‘revolution in philosophy’ would become mistakenly viewed as 
stereotypically not non-Anglophone,
8
 and as disinterested in its continental counterparts and 
unwilling to engage with the history of its discipline. The latter tendency has included a 
general lack of interest in the history of the making of this ‘revolution’, which perhaps led to 
the formation of such stereotypes.
9
 
In contrast to these stereotypes, a quick glance at Russell’s work would serve to clarify 
that his commitment to philosophy transcended any barriers between Britain and the 
continent. Russell’s most famous paper, ‘On Denoting’ (1905), critically introduced two very 
important Germanophone philosophers, Frege and Meinong, to the Anglophone world. Due 
at least in part to his location in Jena, and his not so popular mathematical logicism (which 
was seen by philosophers at the time to fall under mathematical Logistik, rather than the 
philosophical study of the nature of logic), Frege had remained an obscure figure in German 
philosophy.
10
 Russell’s critical discussion of Frege’s views led to a gradual interest in his 
work in the Anglophone world and to an appreciation of the significance of his contributions 
to logic and other fields. 
                                                          
8
 See e.g. Ryle 1971: 182. 
9
 See e.g. Sorell and Rogers 2005. The notable recent rekindling of interest in this area has undermined these 
stereotypes; see e.g. Preston 2005; Floyd 2009. 
10
 See Kusch 1995: 205-206; Käufer 2005: 141-144. 
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The majority of Russell’s writings on such philosophers throughout his career tend 
generally to be of a form that is necessarily critical, such as for example critical analyses,
11
 
reviews,
12
 replies,
13
 or even satire.
14
 In Russell’s work one finds the prototype of an 
attempted application of the new logico-philosophical methods of analysis to doing 
philosophy, and in particular to a certain ‘traditional’ way of philosophising. In a sense, 
Russell is paradigmatic in giving himself not only the new tools through which he may 
dismantle ‘old’ ways of philosophising, but also a certain aura of this newly found sense of 
novelty and modernisation which is involved in transforming part of philosophy into an 
innovatively critical enterprise. Of course, this exercise is not limited to the rejection of 
theses developed on the continent – Russell is perhaps at his best when he attempts to 
dismantle the various Victorian pretentions of his English contemporaries. At its most 
optimistic, the Russellian attitude is one which looks upon some of the most important and 
highly-regarded philosophers of the past as refutable contemporaries who have not been 
privileged with the tools of modern logic and its insight into argumentation. 
It is partly due to Russell that a precedent is set for a certain tendency by ‘Analytic’ 
philosophers to mistakenly see those on the continent as siding with the old ways of thinking 
(rather than with the ‘advances of our logical theory’ (Ryle 1971: 182)). Often such attempts 
are fundamentally flawed, insofar as they inevitably lead to talking past each other: one 
cannot engage one’s interlocutor in rational debate over the extent to which the building 
blocks of her rationality are antiquated through use of those tools which supposedly render it 
antiquated, without falling into a vicious circle. 
                                                          
11
 E.g. Russell 1905; Russell 1914a. 
12
 E.g. his review of Boutroux’s book on James (Russell 1992: 306). 
13
 E.g his exchange with Koyré (Russell 1992: 57-60). 
14
 See Russell 1954: 36-39. 
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It is however clear that, for Russell, if there is to be something like a new ‘scientific’ or 
‘analytic’ mode of philosophising, this is universally applicable, and obviously not simply a 
tool for attacking philosophers on the continent. Yet despite any supranational tendencies in 
early analytic philosophy,
15
 one of the effects of its emergence is, in a way, a de-
continentalising of English philosophy, which in the long-run leads to various distorted 
claims being made on the inferiority of its ’Continental’ counterpart.16 But such borders 
imposed onto international philosophical dialogue (e.g. through false claims to the 
Britishness of ‘Analytic’ philosophy) were simply not in place prior to the Second World 
War.
17
 
 
2.2 Bergson’s French context 
 
Something of the opposite appears to be true of Bergson. One might claim that Bergson is, in 
a way, a particularly French philosopher, and that reaction against his thought paved the way 
for that affiliation between Francophone and Germanophone philosophy which underlies the 
idea of ‘Continental’ philosophy.18 In a sense, this claim is founded on a philosophical 
taxonomy according to which Bergson’s philosophy lies within (by responding to) a 
particularly French Cartesian tradition. Of course ‘Cartesianism’, which one might be 
mistaken in characterising as a French tradition, was as much Bergson’s target as it was a 
tradition Bergson was interacting with. Regardless of the above, Bergson’s thought offered an 
alternative to the then predominant Neo-Kantianism which dominated French academia, and 
                                                          
15
 See Sluga 1998: 111-112. 
16
 E.g. Ryle 1971; Hare 1960. 
17
 Cf. Akehurst, 2010. 
18
 It is also likely that this existentialist reaction to Bergson was to a great extent indebted to Bergson. See e.g. 
Richmond 2007. 
9 
 
which had also been prominent in the Germanophone world where it originated and from 
which it was imported into France. Bergson’s alternative to Neo-Kantianism was one which 
attracted a much larger group of readers, a number of which lay outside the academic 
establishment. Though Russell may have thought of Bergson as representative of the ‘old’ 
philosophy, to many Bergson was seen as a moderniser, and this innovative aspect of his 
thought (with its emphasis on innovation) was conducive to the widespread influence of 
Bergsonism, particularly among quasi-modernistic cultural movements of the time: 
‘Bergsonism composed the very atmosphere in which almost all French realities were steeped 
since 1900’ (Papadopoulo 1942: 2, trans. in Guerlac 2000: 195). 
Bergson’s intellectual influence goes far beyond the national borders of France. A number 
of examples might be given in support of this, such as his involvement with the League of 
Nations’ International Commission on Intellectual Cooperation, which he presided over in the 
nineteen twenties. The mutual admiration between Bergson and William James led to certain 
affinities between Bergsonism and American Pragmatism, culminating in the import of 
Bergson’s philosophy into America which influenced a number of prominent philosophers, 
literary intellectuals and artists in the twenties.
19
 During the twenties Bergson was also 
appropriated into the Germanophone world by being considered as an early ally of the 
movement of Lebensphilosophie which was coming to the fore at the time.
20
 It was the 
Germanophone reaction to this movement, led by Martin Heidegger’s rise to prominence in 
the late twenties, which eventually led to Bergsonism’s popularity being replaced by that of 
                                                          
19
 According to Russell, Bergson and the pragmatists are the ‘chief representatives’ of practical philosophies 
‘which regard action as the supreme good, considering happiness an effect and knowledge a mere instrument of 
successful activity’ (Russell 1914a: 2). According to Russell, such philosophies ‘would have been common 
among Western Europeans if philosophers had been average men’ (Russell 1914a: 2). 
20
 See e.g. Scheller 1972. 
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existentialism in France.
21
 Heidegger’s rise to prominence in Germany is associated with the 
1929 International Philosophers’ Workshop held at Davos in Switzerland, which had as its 
mission statement the rekindling of ties between French and German philosophers following 
the Great War.
22
 Thus the decline of French Bergsonism was characterised by a strengthening 
of mutual influence between German and French philosophy. 
What is perhaps more crucially relevant to our account, though, was the attempted export 
of Bergson’s thought into Britain during the turn of the century which forms the context of 
Russell’s critique of Bergson. It is well known that various literary intellectuals associated 
with British literary modernism, most famously T. S. Eliot, were deeply influenced by 
Bergson.
23
 One of the earliest British Bergsonians associated with the early development of 
literary modernism was T. E. Hulme.
24
 Hulme was a poet, critic, and self-professed dilettante 
in philosophy. Following his expulsion from Cambridge, Hulme’s travels led him to become 
an importer of various philosophical currents from the continent to Britain. For example, 
Hulme’s is one of the first Anglophone references to Husserl’s work, which is viewed in 
favourable comparison to that undertaken by Russell (Hulme 1915: 187) and Moore (Hulme 
1916). 
Hulme wrote a number of articles on Bergson, particularly during the height of British 
Bergsonism around 1911-12.
25
 His ‘Notes on Bergson’ were being published in The New Age 
between October 1911 and February 1912,
26
 his ‘A Personal Impression of Bergson’ in the 
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 Cf. Schrift 2006: 20. 
22
 See e.g. Gordon 2010. 
23
 See e.g. Gillies 1996: 78-106. 
24
 Cf. Schuchard 2003. 
25
 See Thacker 2006: 39-40. 
26
 Hulme 1955: 28-63. 
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Westminster Gazette, November 1911.
27
 He presented a series of lectures titled ‘The 
Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds’ in November and December 1911,28 while he published 
‘Bergson’s Theory of Art’.29 Hulme also translated the first English edition of Bergson’s An 
Introduction to Metaphysics (1912). 
Hulme’s involvement may have tinged British Bergsonism, at its outset, with a certain 
political outlook which was otherwise highly disputed among the multiple French 
interpretations of Bergson. Hulme’s later polemics against Russell’s pacifist stance certainly 
did not help alleviate Russell’s antipathy towards Bergson. Hulme was killed by a shell in 
1917 while fighting in Oostduinkerke, and his early death possibly played its role in limiting 
the dissemination of certain ‘Continental’ philosophers in Britain, including Bergson. 
Another early proponent of Bergson’s thought was Herbert Wildon Carr. In a letter to 
Lady Ottoline Morrell, Russell describes Wildon Carr as ‘a humble stockbroker who happens 
to be Secretary of the Aristotelian Society – a man rather like the host in one of Peacock’s 
novels, but milder’ (Russell 1992: 318). This humble stockbroker was to write the defence of 
Bergson which was in 1914 published alongside a reply by Russell and the original article.
30
 
Bergson’s association with philosophical amateurs (e.g. Hulme, Carr, Eliot, etc) was not 
an exclusively British phenomenon, and Bergson was generally criticised for being a 
populariser even in France.
31
 There were, nevertheless, at least some professional 
philosophers in the Anglophone world, such as William James, but also more importantly 
                                                          
27
 Hulme 1960. 
28
 Reprinted in Hulme 1936:171-214. 
29
 Hulme 1936: 141-170. 
30
 Russell 1914a: 26-32. 
31
 See Guerlac 2000: 197. 
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Russell’s collaborator Alfred North Whitehead, whose positions were quite close to 
Bergson’s and who had partly been influenced by him.32 
 
2.3 Bergson in England 
 
Bergson’s fame in Britain came to its peak in 1911, when Bergson visited the country for a 
number of lectures. On May 26-27 he was awarded an honorary doctorate from the 
University of Oxford, where he presented ‘The Perception of Change’,33 followed after two 
days by the Huxley Lecture which he delivered at the University of Birmingham on ‘Life and 
Consciousness’.34 Later that year he returned in order to present a lecture series titled ‘The 
Nature of the Soul’ on 28 October at University College London.35 Russell wrote of 
Bergson’s lectures that they ‘are reported in the daily newspapers – all England has gone mad 
about him for some reason’ (Russell 1992: 318). Hundreds of articles discussing his 
philosophy followed.
36
 
Russell attended Bergson’s London lecture, and the two philosophers met in person. 
Apparently Russell was seated next to Bergson. In his letters to Morrell, he describes Bergson 
as ‘urbane, gentle, rather feeble physically, with an extraordinarily clever mouth, suggesting 
the adjective “fin” (I don’t know any English equivalent)’ (Russell 1992: 318). Later, he 
would note to Morrell that ‘I don’t hate Bergson. If I didn’t have to read him I shouldn’t be 
tempted to; when I met him I liked him.’ (Russell 1992: 315). 
                                                          
32
 See e.g. Lowe 1949. 
33
 Bergson 1911. 
34
 Bergson 1920. 
35
 Bergson 1966. 
36
 See Gillies 1996: 28. 
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Bergson had a different impression of Russell. Throughout his career, he did not respond 
to any of Russell’s criticisms, and one of his few unofficial remarks on Russell were in 
reference to his visit to London. On 30 October 1911, two days after Bergson’s lecture, 
Russell presented ‘On the Relations of Universals and Particulars’ to the Aristotelian Society. 
Bergson attended the lecture,
37
 and seems to have made some critical remarks at the end of 
Russell’s presentation. Bergson believed that Russell had never forgiven him for refuting ‘his 
completely materialistic presentation of Platonic forms’ (Russell 1992: 319). In fact, Bergson 
told his biographer that Russell ‘avenged himself’ (Russell 1992: 319) in his polemics against 
Bergson, citing particularly his comment that instinct is more powerful in ‘bees, ants and 
Bergson’ (Russell 1992: 319).38 
Russell’s objections to Bergsonism seem to have already arisen during their London 
encounter. From the start, Russell thought of Bergson’s philosophy as imaginative but 
lacking in argument.
39
 He thought Bergson was too set in his views to answer to objections, 
and disliked what he perceived in Bergsonism to be an aversion to science. Perhaps the latter, 
and possibly more powerful dislike, was not one directed towards Bergson in particular, but 
to a specific English Zeitgeist which Russell had chosen to relate to Bergsonism. In his 
comments on the event, he attributes this anti-scientism to the entire gathering, who he 
compared to ‘naughty children when they think (mistakenly) that the governess is away – 
boasting of their power over matter, when matter might kill them at any moment’ (Russell 
1992: 318). Russell does not mention the large size of the audience. Bergson’s popular appeal 
                                                          
37
 See Russell 1992: 319. 
38
 Cf. Russell 1914a: 3. 
39
 See Russell 1992: 318. 
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resulted in the tickets to the event being sold out; his lectures were turned into a gathering of 
high society.
40
 
 
3. Russell’s review of Bergson’s Laughter 
 
Having met Bergson in 1911, Russell went on to read and write about him. His earliest 
commentary on his work was a critical review of Laughter for The Cambridge Review, 
mockingly titled ‘The Professor’s Guide to Laughter’, and published on 18 January 1912. 
Beginning with a comparison of Bergson’s book to the ‘constant stream of etiquette books’ 
(Russell 1992: 385), Russell’s review amounts to little more than a caricature revolving 
around the notion of a professor writing a guide which will fulfil people’s desires ‘to have a 
faultless sense of humour’ (Russell 1992: 385). Russell portrays Bergson more or less as the 
academic who takes his effort to theorise about laughter too seriously. 
Russell is right to begin by noting the lack of books on comedy, though unfortunately even 
in posing this he exaggerates: he claims that Bergson’s book fills an ‘extraordinary lacuna’ 
(Russell 1992: 385) in instruction manuals and introductory books on joking. Bergson’s book 
is indeed unique; not in attempting to teach one how to laugh, but rather in attempting to 
provide a philosophical treatment of a subject which has been understudied since the second 
book of Aristotle’s Poetics, addressing comedy, was lost. 
There was, nevertheless, one book to which Bergson’s work was constantly compared to 
by most of its British reviewers.
41
 This was George Meredith’s Essay on Comedy, published 
in 1877. In this book, Meredith takes comedy as ‘one excellent test of the civilization of a 
country’ (Meredith 1897: 82), proceeding to assign various types of comic traits to particular 
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civilisations. Thus for example the Germans are said to laugh infrequently and monstrously, 
the Middle-Easterners (which are bundled together) are said to drive comedy to the ‘gutters 
of grossness’, while the highest forms of humour are diagnosed as either Attic or Anglo-
Saxon. 
Though Russell does not mention Meredith in comparison to Bergson, it is partly the idea 
of Parisian wit against the humour of Londoners which seems to underlie Russell’s critique: 
 
The truth seems to be that the comic differs with the individual, the country, and the age. 
Latin wit is different from Teutonic humour; the laughter of the Parisian is different from 
the laughter of the Londoner. For this reason it would seem to be impossible to find such a 
formula as M. Bergson seeks. Every formula treats what is living as if it were mechanical, 
and is therefore by his own rule itself a fitting object of laughter. (Russell 1992: 386). 
 
Here Russell appears to have convinced himself of the truth of his own caricature, i.e. that 
Bergson indeed is attempting to offer a formula which captures the entirety of comedy in a 
way which might end up being used as a manual on how to ‘acquire the finest flower of 
Parisian wit’ (Russell 1992: 385). Though Russell’s conviction in his own caricature seems at 
first almost like an innocent form of indulgence in his attempt to produce a comical review of 
a book on comedy, there might nevertheless be a deeper and more troubling set of beliefs 
hiding behind it. 
Russell’s review, though comical, demonstrates at least partly what might have been the 
expected scholarly response to Bergson, insofar as it claims that certain limitations should be 
set for philosophical enquiry, and that a treatise on laughter obviously exceeds such bounds. 
Beside the various excessively satirical statements against Bergson, Russell poses some 
rudimentary objections to the content of Bergson’s book. For example, he criticises his basic 
16 
 
notion that laughter is connected to instances when human bodies resemble mere machines. 
As a counterexample to Bergson’s, he produces an exaggerated version of the standard 
slapstick episode of slipping on fruit peel, where serious injury is involved. He further objects 
to Bergson’s insistence on repetition, by pointing out that the repetition of a bad joke does not 
produce laughter. He rejects Bergson’s association of comedy with comic types, by using the 
example of Balzac as a non-comic writer who uses types, and Falstaff as an individual who is 
a comical character. He mentions the British essayist Charles Lamb, giving an example in 
which the opposite of Bergson’s ‘formula’ holds true, i.e. in which something mechanical is 
humanised to humorous effect. Finally, he remarks that Bergson’s association of laughter 
with absence of feeling finds its negation in those cases where sympathy is the cause of 
laughter; he vaguely refers to Lamb, as well as to Hamlet’s passionate wit which he thinks 
would be less likely outside its tragic context. 
The above objections are serious, yet perhaps all too quick and superficial, though no less 
superficial than might be expected of a book review of less than two pages. What is troubling 
about Russell’s review is its very early association of two elements which will become 
prominent in the rhetoric characteristic of the so-called divide between ‘Analytic’ and 
‘Continental’ philosophy. One could read Russell’s review in such a way as to suggest that 
there might be a vague link between the excesses of Bergson’s attempt to philosophise about 
laughter and the kind of national cultural barriers which Russell accuses Bergson of failing to 
cross. Here we have the first steps toward the formation of the stereotypical ‘Continental’ 
philosopher who, taking himself too seriously, abuses his authority (derived through such 
seriousness) by overstepping his boundaries. Despite Bergson’s philosophy being presented 
as ‘largely a protest against the attempt to bind down living things by the fetters of cast-iron 
formulas’ (Russell 1992: 385), it is overwhelmed by Bergson’s ‘Latin instinct for order’ 
(Russell 1992: 385). Russell’s implication is that by writing a book about laughter, which 
17 
 
attempts to statically capture what laughter is, Bergson contradicts himself. Somehow this 
contradiction is vaguely implicated in some particularly ‘Latin’ character of philosophising. 
 
4. Russell on The Philosophy of Bergson 
 
4.1 The presentation to The Heretics Society 
 
On 11 March 1912, around two months following the publication of his review of Bergson’s 
Essay on Laughter, Russell presented a paper on Bergson to ‘The Heretics Society’ at 
Cambridge. The Heretics were founded in 1909 as a group of undergraduates who met 
primarily to ‘discuss more or less religious matters’ (Russell 1992: 313). They counted 
among their members C. K. Ogden, who was one of the society’s founders and who also 
founded The Cambridge Review (where Russell published his review of Bergson), as well as 
F. P. Ramsey, among others.
42
 Their outlook on the religious matters they were discussing 
was more or less one of radical questioning, and to this end they enlisted the help of both 
famous atheists such as Russell, but also of some, like G. K. Chesterton, who were Christian 
apologists. On 25 February 1912, a week prior to Russell’s presentation, T.E. Hulme had 
presented a paper titled ‘Anti-Romanticism and Original Sin’ to the society.43 
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 Both Ogden and Ramsey were involved in the rising tide of ‘analytic philosophy’ and were responsible for the 
first translation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) 
43
 Hulme and Russell would later, in 1916, engage in a public controversy over the war. The controversy began 
with Hulme’s response to Russell’s lectures on ‘The Principles of Social Reconstruction’, published under the 
pseudonym ‘North Staffs’ in The New Age (North Staffs 1916; Russell 1916); the dispute continued for two 
months in the pages of The Cambridge Review. 
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It is not clear whether the topic of Russell’s presentation was chosen partly as a response 
to the fact that Hulme had recently presented.
44
 In his letter to Morrell dated 12 October 
1911, Russell says that Ogden ‘wanted a paper out of me, and I more or less undertook to 
write about Bergson next term’ (Russell 1992: 313). This seems to show that it was Russell’s 
wish to write about Bergson. It is possible that this interest on Russell’s behalf was partly due 
to curiosity about Bergson’s rising popular appeal, which Russell refers to in his letters to 
Morrell at the time.
45
  
Russell had already begun reading Bergson prior to agreeing with Ogden to write his 
paper on him. Interestingly, Russell’s earliest impressions from reading Bergson resulted in 
his very brief remarks to Morrell about Bergson’s conception of nothingness: 
 
In the intervals of my morning, I read Bergson on Nothing, which he thinks is nothing. 
This led me to a number of reflections on negation – a very puzzling topic. (Russell 1992: 
313). 
 
What precisely is intriguing about this all too brief and perhaps obscure comment by Russell 
is that it is here that the Russell-Bergson exchange comes closest to touching on the 
subsequent history of the ‘Analytic’-‘Continental’ divide. Russell’s (1905) criticism of 
Meinong is perhaps the first move in a long line of criticisms by philosophers deemed to be 
representatives of the ‘Analytic’ camp weighed against representative ‘Continental’ 
philosophers.
46
 The paradigmatic case of such critique is Rudolf Carnap’s (1931) attack 
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 Russell may have targeted Hulme when he called Bergson irrationalist (Thacker 2006: 40). 
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against Heidegger’s exclamation that ‘Das Nichts nichtet’ (the nothing nothings),47 which 
was repeated by A. J. Ayer against both Heidegger (1936) and Sartre (1945); the same 
sentence by Heidegger is also the topic of various remarks by Wittgenstein and Quine.
48
 
Nevertheless, Russell’s commentary on Bergson’s conception of nothingness consists of a 
quasi-tautology (i.e. the claim that nothing is thought by Bergson to be nothing), and an 
expression of puzzlement briefly stated in a letter to a lover; not much is to be made of this. 
The sense of some radical gap between two and only two cultures of philosophising, one 
‘Continental’ and the other ‘Analytic’, is wholly absent from Russell’s criticism of Bergson. 
Of course Russell notoriously misunderstood Bergson, unquestionably due to reading him 
with a view to demolish what he thought was the imaginative anti-scientistic philosophy of a 
mystic. On particular issues Russell saw Bergson as his antithesis,
49
 and thus to a certain 
extent he went on to construe in his work on Bergson something of what he thought to be 
antithetical to his own work. 
Misunderstanding does not, however, prevail in Russell’s interpretation of Bergson. 
Clearly Russell purposefully misconstrues some aspects of Bergson for comic effect. His 
presentation to a lay public at the Heretic Society perhaps drove Russell to exaggeration.
50
 
Russell himself afterwards described the paper as ‘undully flippant’ (Russell 1992: 318) and 
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 See Russell 1992: 313. 
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regretted some of the jokes; nevertheless he did include a version of it in his History of 
Western Philosophy (1946).
51
 
 
4.2 Criticism of Bergson’s account of number and space 
 
Despite all the jokes, Russell includes in his criticism at least one serious objection to 
Bergson, which he derives from his own work on the foundation of mathematics. This is the 
infamous critique of Bergson’s conception of number, extended to his association of quantity 
with space. Russell’s self-professed pedantry results in an argument which is based on 
distinguishing between three possible meanings of the term number which are confused in 
Bergson’s use of the term.52 According to Russell, number can mean either (i) the general 
concept number, which can be applied to some particular numbers, (ii) particular numbers, or 
(iii) any collection to which particular numbers may be applicable. Bergson, Russell 
surmises, defines number as a collection of units, a definition which therefore excludes (i) 
and (ii). Yet to define number as (iii), would mean to confusedly imply that (iii) is either (ii) 
or (i), i.e. it would be to think that a collection, such as the twelve apostles, somehow is the 
particular number 12 or even number in general. The particular number 12 is something that 
collections of twelve, as opposed to collections of eleven, have in common. Thus, according 
to Russell,  
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the number 12 is neither a collection of twelve terms, nor is it something which all 
collections have in common ; and number in general is a property of 12 or 11 or any other 
number, but not of the various collections that have twelve terms or eleven terms. (Russell 
1914: 14) 
 
This is meant to undermine Bergson’s idea of the primacy of geometry over logic, and 
particularly his claim that number is primarily spatial. According to Russell, number is not 
(iii) and thus is more abstract than any particular collection to which a number may be 
applied. It is impossible for (i) and (ii) to be pictured in space, whereas it is not for (iii).
53
 
Russell furthermore expands this criticism to the entirety of Bergson’s ‘contention that 
every plurality of separate units involves space’ (Russell 1914: 15), by suggesting that 
Bergson’s insistence on space is centred on vision. Bergson is, according to Russell, an 
individual in whom visual perception, rather than e.g. aural or tactile, is more acute: a 
‘visualiser’.54 Thus, for example, a series of clock strikes may be counted (as a plurality of 
separate units) without being placed in an imaginary space. It is, according to Russell, a mere 
autobiographical fact about Bergson which leads him to reduce all forms of pluralities of 
separate units into spatially separable pluralities. 
 
4.3 Bergson and the British Idealists 
 
Though Russell passes over them too quickly, the above are two examples of objections 
which may have opened up a dialogue between Russell’s and Bergson’s positions, and indeed 
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Wildon Carr who replied in place of Bergson did in fact undertake a reply to these theses. 
The more fundamentally problematic aspect of Russell’s treatment of Bergson emerges when 
Russell associates him to a particular British strand of thought which he had once identified 
with and now seeks to oppose, namely the British Idealists. 
Calling Bergson’s philosophy ‘anti-intellectualist’, Russell accuses Bergson of thriving 
‘upon errors and confusions of the intellect’ (Russell 1914: 16), preferring ‘bad thinking to 
good’ (Russell 1914: 16) in his attempt to show that intuition is preferable to intellect. 
According to Russell, Bergson’s anti-intellectualism extends to his interpretations of science 
and mathematics, which Russell thinks are there as a rhetorical device for convincing careless 
readers.
55
 Of course, Bergson’s careless readers, ignorant of the aspects of science and 
mathematics Bergson interprets, are most likely equally ignorant of Russell’s technical work 
in the foundations of arithmetic.
56
 
Russell avoids commenting on Bergson’s views of biology and physiology, but focuses on 
his views of mathematics invoking his expertise of the subject.
57
 His basic claim here is that 
Bergson ‘has deliberately preferred traditional errors in interpretation to the more modern 
views which have prevailed among mathematicians for the last half century’ (Russell 1914: 
16). Russell attributes such traditional errors to Hegel and his followers, who had attempted 
to ‘prove all mathematics self-contradictory’ (Russell 1914: 17) based upon the ‘fallacies and 
confusions’ (Russell 1914: 17) which lay at the foundations of the infinitesimal calculus in 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
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Russell believes that modern work on the foundations of mathematics had removed the 
obstacles which had caused these problems; of course his own work, together with 
Whitehead, was largely responsible for this. He therefore complains that following Hegel, 
philosophers have paid no heed to such achievements in the philosophy of mathematics, the 
foundations of arithmetic, the creation of modern logic, and all other relevant fields. Insofar 
as the latter is concerned, he is of course right, given that a large part of the innovative work 
done by philosophers on arithmetic was deemed too mathematical (and therefore extra-
philosophical) by philosophers at the time. 
However the justification Russell gives for philosophers’ ignorance of new developments 
in mathematics is puzzling to say the least: 
 
so long as the main object of philosophers is to show that nothing can be learned by 
patience and detailed thinking, but that we ought rather to worship the prejudices of the 
ignorant under the title of ‘reason’ if we are Hegelians, or of ‘intuition’ if we are 
Bergsonians, so long philosophers will take care to remain ignorant of what 
mathematicians have done to remove the errors by which Hegel profited. (Russell 1914: 
17). 
 
Here Russell’s indictment of Hegelian ‘reason’ and its grouping together with Bergsonian 
‘intuition’ muddles the waters.58 Of course the former part of the equation refers to his 
contemporaries in Britain, the older generation of philosophers (typically bundled together as 
‘British Idealists’, to a large extent due to Russell’s en masse rejection of their work) who 
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paid little attention, Russell had felt, to the implications of advances in the foundations of 
arithmetic for philosophy. Whether this is absolutely true or not is not to be decided here. 
What is, however, puzzling is this identification of one of Russell’s enemies with another, 
which demolishes the substantial differences which exist between the two. It is rather unclear 
how the ‘anti-intellectualism’ which Russell attributes to Bergson can be equated with the 
absolute idealism of the Bradleyans. Russell’s equation blurs the challenge that the new wave 
of British Bergsonism posed to any remnants of the old British academic establishment 
composed primarily of Neo-Hegelians, a challenge which might have resembled that which 
Bergsonism posed to the Neo-Kantian establishment in French academia, or later to the 
Germanophone Neo-Kantian academic establishment. If both Bergsonism and Hegelianism, 
following ‘the example of most philosophers’ (Russell 1914: 16) ignored the advances of 
modern logic, this clearly cannot be due to some common ground in their otherwise utterly 
opposed insistence on the one hand on ‘reason’, on the other on ‘intuition’. 
 
5. The ‘Analytic’-‘Continental’ divide 
 
The role that Russell’s review played in the British reception of and reaction to Bergson, 
though important, should be placed within the context of the hundreds of articles, many 
critical, which were written on Bergson after 1911. British Bergsonism became a sort of 
fashion that soon came to be overshadowed by the Great War. Its demise perhaps owed more 
to the war than to Russell. Russell was quickly judged to have misunderstood Bergson,
59
 and 
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perhaps this impression was reinforced by Bergson’s lack of a reply to Russell, other than his 
brief endorsement of Carr’s defence.60 
Russell’s critique of Bergson was directed as much towards the phenomenon of the import 
of the latest ‘Continental’ philosopher, as it was towards its native importers (e.g. Hulme, 
Carr). Russell characteristically wrote about M. Bergson, while Carr replied about Mr. 
Bergson. Russell furthermore insisted on forging a link, vague though it may be, between this 
import and prior imports, such as Hegelianism. Yet when Russell speaks of such foreigners, 
he is also addressing a particularly British scene. 
The image of an ‘Analytic’-‘Continental’ divide refers to an absence of interaction 
between two seemingly heterogeneous traditions. Thus, it would be inappropriate to talk of 
an ‘Analytic’-‘Continental’ divide in 1912, at the peak of British Bergsonism. Nevertheless, 
Russell introduces a number of stereotypes in his discussion of Bergson, which will plant the 
seeds for future misconstrual of the divide: (i) Bergson is accused of being unaware of the 
advances in modern logic,
61
 (ii) Bergson is bundled together with Hegel (with the implication 
that they are both traditional pre-analytic philosophers), and finally (iii) Bergson’s 
philosophical arguments are dismissed, and he is demoted to the status of a poet.
62
 Though 
these particular accusations do little harm when applied to a particular philosopher (who may 
dismiss them as Russell’s personal grudge against him), and could possibly even be construed 
in such a manner as to contain a grain of truth, they are misleading when projected onto the 
idea of a ‘Continental philosophy’ in general. Thus, Russell’s critique of Bergson’s 
philosophy, far from being the product of some general split between two kinds of 
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philosophy, is productive of a number of attributes associated with an image of contemporary 
Western philosophy as divided into two. 
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